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RESPONSIBILITY AND- CRIME.'
A STUDY AND INTERPRETATION, OF THE LATER WORKS OF ALFRED BINET.

ELIZABETH: S. KITE. 2

The humanitarian spirit that is abroad in the world today nowhere
manifests itself more clearly than in the desire to understand and to deal
justly with that large refractory class of humanity known as criminals
and delinquents. The sentiment of modern society towards its offending members has been summarized in the following terms:
Punishment Should be Beneficial but Contained in Such Measure that
it Be Not Unjust.
To be beneficial the criminal must have sufficient intellect to relate
the punishment to his act; to be just it must take into consideration
his state of mind at the time it was committed.
Public sentiment recognizes different degrees of responsibility in
relation to given acts. Even our newspapers bear testimony to the fact
that of the many thousand crimes which every year are brought before
the public, a very different sentiment prevails in regard to the culpability of the offender. Certain atrocities, such as the murder of an entire
family by a parent, are at once recognized to be the deed of a maniac,
upon whom it would be absurd to inflict the death penalty. In the
case of an imbecile setting fire to a building, thereby jeopardizing or
destroying human lives, public sentiment demands that so dangerous an
individual be taken into custody, but revolts from inflicting upon the
culprit the legal penalty for his deed; and this because it would be
neither beneficial nor just, for since the imbecile is lacking in the power
to relate ideas, he cannot be taught that fire is dangerous, therefore the
punishment could have no educative value; it would not be just, because this inability to realize what he has done, makes him irresponsible
for his deed.
On the other hand, there are crimes continually coming before the
public which are so cleverly planned, especially co-operative crimes, such
as burglary, systematic fraud, the commerce of prostitution, in regard
to which public sentiment requires speedy and full application of the
penal laws; in the first place, because the persons concerned have
shown evidence of intelligence, of the power to make means at their dis'Read before the American Prison Association Congress at Indianapolis,
October
15, 1913.
2
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posal serve a definite end, and are thus judged to be responsible; in the
second place, because having the power to relate ideas, there is a possibility that the punishment inflicted may teach them to abstain in future
from similar acts, even if it does not effect a change of heart or character.
Responsibility Absolutely Denied to Man by a Certain School of Modern
Scientists.
In striking contrast to this world-old view of humanity in regard
to responsibility, are the avowed opinions of a certain school of modem
,scientists.
The theory first voiced more than half a century ago by Herbert
Spencer in his "Data of Ethics," amplified by later European scientists,
has found perhaps its most advanced expression in an article by Dr. C.
B. Davenport in the July, 1913, number of the Popular Science
Monthly, entitled "Heredity, Culpability, Praiseworthiness, Punishment
and Reward," in which he denies human responsibility in toto.
To the thoughtful reader the clear and concise statements of Dr.
Davenport are productive of a decided shock, for they reduce man to
the level of the brute, make him a merely biological product, the result
of hereditary laws, and take conduct and destiny wholly out of his
hands. He becomes a creature neither praiseworthy nor blamable in
any of his acts, devoid of personality, will, and the power of choice.
Romantic, heroic, or cowardly actions become alike impossible to him,
for he acts as he does simply because .hemust. Distressing as are such
ideas to contemplate, yet when men like Dr. Davenport in America,
and Dr. Ballet in Europe take this stand, they cannot be ignored, but
one must dig deep in order to find wherein lies our antagonism to their
theories. The lucid exposition of this extreme materialistic view as
given by Dr. Davenport makes this possible. Nothing could be clearer
or more concise than his statements, and when taken one by one it is
surprising, considering the unfavorable impression made by the whole,
fo find how true most of them are.
This it would seem is because Dr. Davenport, being a scientist,
asserts real facts, but not being a philosopher, has interpreted all human conduct by attributing it wholly to inherent traits plus such culture as they may have received. The inhibitory .mechanism which he
calls a device for controlling conduct, results, he says, from hereditary
determiners and has nothing whatever to do with will. His studies,
excellent as they are, and original, having been confined to heredity in
animals and to the inheritance of traits in man, have led him, it would
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seem, to ignore a vast field of human evidence and positively to deny a
spiritual nature in man. To his mind all punishment is unjust, and
no action either good or bad is worthy of praise or blame.
Philosophy or the Science of Sciences Necessary for a Correct Interpretation of Phenomena.
It is exactly in this connection that one of the soundest thinkers
of modern times has said: "All the sciences have their own departments, and in going out of them they attempt to do what they really
cannot do; and that the more mischievously, because they do teach
what in its place is true, though when out of its place, peiverted or
carried to excess, is not true. And as every man has not the capacity
for separating truth from falsehood, they persuade the world of what
is false by urging upon it what is true." "Alan," he further says, "whose
life lies in the cultivation of one science to the exclusion of any philosophical view of the whole, has all the obstinacy of the bigot whom he
scorns, for each exalts his one science into a key, if not of all knowledge, at least of many things more than belong to it." The philosophic
habit of mind prevents mistakes of this character and enables the specialist to guard the limits within which his science must be kept-for
his partial truth is true only when taken in relation to other partial
truths, all of which must be considered in giving a just estimate of
the whole.
Responsibility from the Psychological Standpoint.
It is generally admitted, as has been shown, that children, the
mentally defective and the insane, are less responsible for their dangerous acts than normal adults; that very young children are less responsible than older ones, an imbecile than a moron, a lunatic than one
slightly deranged. Here it is a question of more or less; but to admit
more or less is always to admit the fact, for if some human beings
have less responsibility than others, then there is a form of responsibility. The question then becomes: how shall we find this norm and by
whom shall it be fixed?
The lamented French phychologist, Alfred Binet, a philosopher
as well as a scientist, whose untimely death two years ago cut short his
work barely begun upon criminal psychology, has expressed more
clearly perhaps than any one else so far has done, the scientific basis of
the general belief before alluded to, in human responsibility. But it
must not be thought that his views can be found put forth in any such
concise form as are those of Dr. Davenport, for Binet was too compre-
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hensive a thinker to permit of his believing that the complex phenomena
of human action could find summation in a few terse formulas. Of
such formulas Binet has said: "C'est de la litt6rature, ce n'est pas de la
science."
By a careful study of his later works, however, we may arrive at
a comprehensive idea of his view of human responsibility, and consequently of what he considered beneficial and just in punishment.
In his study upon "The Aptitude of Imbeciles" he brings forth
conclusive proof that the essential characteristic of normal man is the
possession of higher -processes of direction, of choice, of criticism and
of will by means of which it is possible for him to pose an end to be
attained, having chosen it as desirable, and finally to make the circum.stances of his life bend themselves to its attainment. To grant to man
this power of choice is to admit his responsibility.
"Life," he says, "results from a continual work of adaptation of
the intelligence of the person to his surroundings," but even here "there
exists a hierarchy between possible acts of adaptation; there are acts
which are insignificent and others which are important; there are those
which have small and immediate advantages, and those whose advantages are in the distance, but immense. To know how to choose is to
put in its place our lower nature, to dominate the instincts, to elevate
life. The mentality of a child, of an imbecile, and unfortunately also
of very many adults, and who for this reason can never rise, consists in
preferring the immediate pleasure of the moment to the durable pleasure of the morrow, and who consequently develop an activity which
does not calculate, does not reflect, and above all does not economize
and therefore can collect no capital."
The "inhibitory mechanism" which Dr. Davenport makes a
purely biological function, the result of physical determiners, is raised
by Binet, to its place in the moral realm; the vital energy there stored,
man is left free to conserve by means of his intelligence or to squander
through uncontrolled impulse. To complete the image, let us add that
moral energy, like the miser's fortune, when once spent, leaves the
spender in a state of penury, with nothing for himself and nothing to
ass on to his offspring. If he wish to energize his life again by storing up capital, it can only be done in one way and that is through selfconquest.
Responisbility and Legislation.
Let us now come to the practical problem of crime. The French
nation is in advance of us in giving legal recognition to attenuated responsibility, for though we do in practice recognize it as a fact, as
66
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proven by the notorious Thaw case and others, yet our criminal code
has nothing analogous to Article 64 of the Penal Code of France, which
is expressed in the following terms: "There is neither crime nor delinquency when the accused was in a state of dementia at the moment of
the action; or when he was compelled by a force to which he was unable to offer resistance."
In practice the medical expert whose intervention this article compels, is empowered by the following formula: "Investigate whether the
accused was the victim of a malady whose nature impaired his responsibility and to what degree."
. Dr. Ballet and others have recently objected to furnish replies using the term responsibility, because they felt that this would imply a
belief in the philosophical doctrine of free will. Their attitude in this
has been prod.uctive of considerable embarrassment to the courts. Binet
insists that the objection is out of place, and says: "Every sensible
man who admits that one is only responsible for those acts that are
freely willed and freely executed, gives to the word liberty a totally different sense than its metaphysical sense; he calls 'free' an act of will
which expresses our personality, and which is not under the influence
of a force foreign to our person. The expert is called only to determine the responsibility of the accused by taking as term of comparison the responsibility of a normal person; is his responsibility equal to
his, or less; here is the whole question. It is very precise, and there
is no metaphysical argument that can prevent its being posed or being
answered." Binet thus maintains the position that normal human beings are responsible for their acts, and crimes can with justice be imputed to them. The question of irresponsibility can only arise when
the subject is not normal, either through lack of development, as is the
case with children and mental defectives, or through disease which
throws into disorder or weakens the mental faculties.
Moronity and Imbecility in Relation to Crime.
Stated in its simplest form imbecility and moronity correspond to
different stages of childhood, from five to eleven years. With them, as
Binet says, "there is such an arrest, an insufficiency in the stages of
their development, affecting alike their intelligence and their moral
sense, that with double right they are placed within the ranks of the
irresponsible."
Civilized nations are ceasing to consider the delinquencies of childhood as crimes, and when it is once fully grasped that human behavior
depends upon mental and moral, more than upon physical development,
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it will be the mind of the culprit that will first claim the attention of
judge and juries. By the aid of that simple instrument, the Binet-Simon Measuring Scale of Intelligence, which at least to the tenth year
is as perfect as a human instrument can be expected to be, it is always
possible to decide accurately the mental age of the subject if he be in
reality a child. Around the border line the difficulty of accurately deiding will forever remain, but for those whose mentality does not deVelop beyond that of a child of eight or nine, or ten years, regardless of
the length of time they have lived, there can be no doubt of their irresponsibility. For self-protection as well as for humanitarian reasons,
persons of this class must be cared for by society at large. With intelligent direction supplied from without, they can, in nearly all cases, be
made not only harmless but distinctly helpful elements in the state.
Distinction Between the Insane (aliens) and the Criminal.
"The gravity of this distinction," Binet says, "can escape no one;
in so far as it is just, conformable to Article 64 of the Penal Code, not
to treat as criminals the insane, who are not responsible for their dangerous acts, in so far as it is equally urgent not to let repression be
softened by declaring criminals irresponsible, who with too much complacency have sometimes been assimilated with lunatics. Society ha,
the duty to defend herself energetically against those who are detrimental to her; and it would be disastrous if through confusion of certain medical and philosophical ideas, under pretext, for instance, that
free will is a chimera or that every criminal has a diseased mind thai
the magistrates, the juries and the medical experts came to declare
averred criminals as irresponsible." "The capacity for imputability,"
Kraeplin says, "depends upon two elements: First, a faculty of intelligence; the general faculty of judging what is permitted or forbidden,
what is useful or harmful, and the special faculty of comprehending
the importance and the consequences of the act which one commits.
Second, the faculty of volition; that is, the faculty of choosing between
several possible acts, and deciding after reflection and conformable to
the tendencies of one's own personality. To put it briefly, imputability
depends upon a certain amount of intelligence and will." All this is
very clear; evidently the two great masters of alienation, one French,
the other German, Binet and Kraeplin, are in accord in recognizing
that normal man has the power of choosing between several possible
acts and that he is therefore responsible.
The criminal, then, is a person whose intelligence is sound. On
the other hand, the intellect of the dement is more or less disordered.
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The criminal knows what he is doing, he is able to realize the bearing
of his acts; the dement does not know what he is doing, and is not
able to realize the bearing of his acts; the criminal is responsible, the
dement is irresponsible. Lack of balance is what is essentially characteristic of dementia. "This lack of balance" as Binet says, "is composed of two elements; there is an exaggerated production of certain
manifestations; for instance, an idea becomes an obsession; a false reasoning becomes a cause of continual reflection and passes to a state of
delirious conception; a slight depression becomes despair, etc. This is
the active element, the impulse; and its counterpart is a slackening, a
weakening of the higher processes of direction, choice, criticism, will,
by means of which a normal person effectively controls the production
of his active functions."
"Certain crimes," Binet says, "are in themselves almost exclusive
of the idea of alienation. For example: the fabrication of false money;
fraud in the world of business, etc. These crimes require on the one
hand a great liberty of intelligence; on the other hand they have essentially pecuniary, that is to say, normal motives. It is in fact, absolutely exceptional that a lunatic commits a crime by a desire for lucre.
Still another indication: the association of evil-doers has rarely a pathological character because the lunatic has this peculiar trait that he
isolates himself from his kind, he lives alone, he acts alone. "Criminal
acts are sometimes committed," Binet notes, "by those suffering from a
form of lunacy where, strictly speaking, the intelligence is intact, but
vitiated by delirium or other morbid symptoms rendering the doer irresponsible. Thus a murder may be committed through hallucination
or through a paroxysm of unjustifiable jealousy. There also appear
from time to time criminals who simulate insanity, hoping thereby to
deceive the experts and escape merited punishment. These, as Binet
makes clear in his definition of alienation, are seldom difficult to discover, for as a rule, "they fall into an excess of absurdity and incoherence. Alienation has its laws which cannot be invented if they are not
known."
The Criminal.
Row shall we then characterize the criminal?
"We may safely establish this rule," Binet says, "that the criminal
is a person whose mental faculties are in a sound condition; he knows
what he does, he realizes the bearing of his acts, therefore he is responsible for them."
It may seem a contradiction in terms to speak of the criminal as
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normal, but this simply means that his anti-social acts do not spring
from a disordered intellect, but rather from a disordered moral nature,
which condition may in a certain sense be considered normal, since its
possibility belongs in its very essence to that power of choice, which as
we have seen, is the distinctive attribute of normal man. The choosing
of a base or evil end, does not in itself weaken the intellect; on the contrary, the intellect may develop tremendously under such conditions like
the power of an athlete, trained to the utmost, that he may win in a
given contest. What does weaken the intellect is choosing no end at
all-but allowing "any old thing," according to that most pernicious
Americanism, to have sway. To this state of mind Binet has given
the very technical term n'importequism,which is the sure forerunner of
degeneracy, a totally different problem from crime.
Again we are right to call a criminal normal, because any man
might under given conditions commit a criminal act if he allowed himself to do so, and having committed one such act, find it easier to commit another and so on and so on, until finally he became an avowed
criminal; also such a- man has in himself the power to say, "Fool that
I am! MIy criminal acts bring me only misery and disgrace. I will
rouse myself, control the brute within me, and take my place among
men." So he comes out reformed, his moral' nature again in order,
that is to say reason and will no longer slaves of passion, but passion
chained and under the control of reason and will.
Not every criminal reforms, however; for there are those who deliberately prefer crime. Perhaps one of the strongest criminal characters in literature is the celebrated Tromp-le-mort, a creation of Balsac's.
Through him is caught -a glimpse of a subterranean world, a world of
co-operative crime, with its aristocracies and its menial class, its code of
honor, its laws, its fixed ideals. At every point it is, antagonistic to
the social order, but it is held together by a keen and ever watchful intelligence, an esprit de corps that makes it the power it is. No medical
expert needs to be called when Tromp-le-mort falls into the hands of
the police. There is no one who questions his responsibility. He has
deliberately chosen crime because he loves hazardous adventure, because
he loves power and cares to play with wealth. Comfort, ease, tranquility mean nothing to him, he despises them all.
Although in real life there are not many Tromp-le-morts, yet there
are lesser men who are also criminals, regarding whom neither judge
nor jury think of raising the question of their responsibility. But un-.
fortunately there are others who commit crimes; as we have seen, there
are imbeciles and morons, there Are maniacs, the obsessed, the born
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criminals; there are also a host of degenerates, as the perverts, the morally insane, etc., about whose crimes, when the occasion arises, -there.
comes in a very grave doubt as to their responsibility.
Degeneracy and Crime.
Of degeneracy, especially moral degeneracy, very little is definitely
known; until more is known, Binet insists that we cease to'repeat "that
vague word which explains nothing." And yet the accepted meaning of
the word passing from a good state to a bad, from a bad to one that is
worse, when applied to humanity expresses a very real and often observed fact.
A degenerate is a being who has lost or is losing his power of
choice and of will, whose personality is disea.sed or disintegrating, and
who in very truth is often urged on to hideous deeds by a force over
which he has no control. He is obsessed or possessed as if by a demoniac spirit.
Like the insane, degenerate criminals act alone and by stealth. Incendiarism, petty thieving for morbid or useless ends. Sodomy-these
are some of the crimes which they commit. M[ostly the mentality of
this class is of a low order, but Binet himself notes that certain degenerates, sexual inverts for instance, often are possessed by an unusually
brilliant intellect. It is precisely in dealing with this group that the
gravest difficulties arise in deciding the degree of responsibility which
such subjects retain. As has been shown, the extreme cases present but
slight difficulties; it is the question of attenuated responsibility, where
the accused is near the border line of normality, that the great difficulty
of decision lies.
The study of criminology during the past century by Lombroso
and others, "far from establishing a clear distinction between the two
categories has," as Binet says, "rather resulted in confusing them. It
has been proven, for instance, that the criminal presents many of the
physical characteristics of the insane. Numerous studies, rather hasty
it is true, and suggestive statistics, although lacking in critical sense,
have shown that the criminal has a peculiar heredity; it is a criminal
heredity, or insane or alcoholic, and from this it has been concluded
that there is here an excuse for their anti-social acts. More than this
the distinction between crime and insanity has ceased clearly to appear,
and this is much more serious."
"To our minds, neither the accumulation of physical stigmata nor
the most charged heredity is sufficient to stamp a man who commits a
crime as irresponsible. We know, however, that we have here an ex-

ELIZABETH S. KITE

tremely delicate question; one will always have trouble in distinguishing criminals from moral maniacs; but we must not permit our theories
upon the subject to, make a sort of breach through which nearly all the
criminal world can introduce itself into the realm of the insane there
to find impunity."
The PracticalProblem. What Then Is to Be Done?
First it is necesbary, Binet says, that a dividing line be established,
even if arbitrary, between responsibility and irresponsibility, that the
matter must not be left to the subjective valuation of the alienist.
There are, he admits, between the two states, all the degrees of transition, as between day and night. In the latter case the- law has fixed
the hour when it is called day, so that, the hour having struck, a magistrate has the right to enter a private house to execute an arrest; although the fixing of this be arbitrary it works out in practice better
than to allow each officer to decide for himself when the day has arrived.
More than this, even when the dividing line has been set up the
question remains, what shall we do with those judged irresponsible?
Shall we turn them unpunished back into the community to repeat
their noxious crimes? Evidently not. For the mentally defective and
for lunatic, sequestration or colonization is not only advisable but possible. With that vast borderline group, however, which offers by far
the most difficult social problem with which our age has to deal, no
such easy solution offers itself. Binet says: "The moment that it is
proven that the accused has an attenuated responsibility the judges are
indulgent and inflict penalties less severe than those designated by law;
he is then enabled to repeat the act more easily. Good sense and the
defense of society require, on the contrary, that he be incapacitated to
do harm, since he is more dangerous than a normal person. But this
is not an objection against the principle of attenuated responsibility; it
is rather a criticism against our system of penalty."
The time is at hand when this most important social problem must
be grappled with in earnest. Attenuated responsibility means moral
disease, and moral disease is more insidious in its attacks than smallpox
or tuberculosis. Modern science is finding a way to protect man from
those diseases which attack only the physical body; shall we not turn
our attention to that which blasts the entire being of man?
But in doing this we must not forget that while it is necessary to
recognize our ills in order to rise above them, no real reform can be
effected except in holding before our minds an exalted ideal that will
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lead us ever up and out of our ills. The deep lesson of the Bible story
must not be forgotten; how the Israelites when bitten by serpents in
the desert, were bidden not to look at their wounds if they would be
healed, but at the golden serpent that was set up; so we must keep before us the perfect model lifted up that all men might be saved.
Let us then close with the words of the great Paul to the refined
Phillipians: "For the rest, my brethren, whatsoever things are true,
whatsoever pure, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely,
whatsoever of good report, if there be any praise, if there be any virtue,
tbink on these things."

